State Session Freeze Laws—Potential Solution or
Unconstitutional Restriction?
Dru Swaim*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Citizens United1 decision in 2010 reduced Congress’s
ability to constitutionally regulate money in elections, proponents of
campaign finance reform have looked for alternative ways to achieve the
goals of greater transparency and reduce the amount of money spent in
federal elections. In the three years since Citizens United, the amount of
money spent in federal campaigns has increased exponentially. Although
the total money spent for the 2012 election has yet to be finalized, virtually all publicly available estimates have the total spending at over $6
billion.2 This total is more than $700 million higher than the amount
spent in the 2008 election.3 In fact, the total amount of money spent in
federal elections has nearly doubled since 2000.4 In the four years between 2008 and 2012, the money spent on congressional races alone has
increased by over $1 billion.5
Beyond the direct impact that Citizens United had on the amount of
money spent in political races, many media commentators and law professors have since suggested that traditional mechanisms for controlling
money in politics, specifically restrictions on campaign contributions and
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1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. See, e.g., John Hudson, The Most Expensive Election in History by the Numbers, ATLANTIC
WIRE (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/11/most-expensive-electionhistory-numbers/58745/.
3. Id.
4. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
5. Id.
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expenditures, are now impossible as a result of this case.6 It is undeniable
that Citizens United drastically altered the landscape of campaign finance
reform, allowing for massive increases in the amount of money spent on
political campaigns.7 Furthermore, when the Supreme Court had a
chance to revisit the precedents set in Citizens United in 2012, it refused
to hear the case, signaling that reform advocates will have to work within
the restrictions enshrined by Citizens United.8
Citizens United represents a serious blow to the traditional methods
used to restrict the amount of money in politics: limitations on the
amounts campaigns can accept and spend. 9 Moreover, despite the difficulties facing federal reform laws, public distrust of Congress continues
to grow,10 demonstrating the need to take steps to help restore faith in the
political process. Although some would argue that meaningful campaign
finance reform is impossible in the wake of Citizens United, this belief is
shortsighted and ignores other potential methods to control the flow of
money into politics. The federal government should look to state governments to find new ways to regulate campaign finance. Specifically,
the federal government should adopt a specific temporal limitation on
when incumbent members of Congress can accept campaign contributions.

6. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013);
Senator Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2010); Russ
Feingold, The Money Crisis: How Citizens United Undermines Our Elections and the Supreme
Court, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 145 (June 14, 2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/
online/money-crisis; Richard L. Hasen, Worse Than Watergate, SLATE (July 19, 2012, 2:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/campaign_finance_after_citi
zens_united_is_worse_than_watergate.html; Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance
Reform, NATIONALAFFAIRS (Winter 2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/themyth-of-campaign-finance-reform.
7. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. et al., The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on Campaign
Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251
(2010); Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011).
8. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (rejecting Montana’s ban
on independent expenditures without hearing oral argument, signaling the Court’s unwillingness to
reconsider the holding in Citizens United).
9. Although Citizens United is the best known case, another case, Speech Now v. FEC was
responsible for creating the much derided “SuperPACs.” See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
10. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST,
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR (2010), available at http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf.
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While it is true that “session freeze”11 statutes are unlikely to reduce
the overall amount of money spent in elections, they do create a brightline delineation between the two roles of an elected official: campaigning
and governing. State legislatures have found session freezes to be an effective way to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in
state legislatures.12 With the traditional methods of regulating campaign
finance becoming harder to utilize, the federal government should consider emulating these state laws to help restore faith in government.13
Different forms of session freeze statutes have been utilized by different
states, and an examination of these statutes and the cases interpreting
them demonstrates that there is a clear way to formulate a federal law
that would function within the bounds of the precedent set by Citizens
United. Accordingly, Congress should implement a law that would prevent currently sitting federal elected officials from accepting campaign
contributions from lobbyists and lobbyists’ employers while Congress is
in session.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background of the law underpinning all campaign finance restrictions, and examines the structure
of state session freeze statutes and the outcomes of challenges to these
statutes. Part III suggests a specific proposal for a federal version of a
session freeze. Part IV addresses critiques of the proposal and examines
the issues it would face if challenged in court, but still argues that the
proposal would be constitutional and effective in addressing campaign
finance reform. Part V concludes.
II. FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AND STATE SESSION FREEZE
STATUTES
Campaign finance law is regulated at both the federal and state level. Although federal races are regulated through federal law and state
races are regulated through state law, both laws must still meet the stand-

11. A “session freeze” statute is one that places temporal restrictions on when a campaign for
state office can accept contributions. These laws restrict the acceptance of contributions during the
legislative session, hence the term session freeze. See, e.g., WASH. STATE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
COMMISSION, REGULAR SESSION FREEZE STARTS ON DECEMBER 15, 2012 (2012), available at
http://web.pdc.wa.gov/archive/guide/brochures/pdf/2012/Freeze.2013.pdf.
12. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999).
13. Congress’s approval rating tied the all-time low in August 2012. See Frank Newport, Congress Approval Ties All-Time Low at 10%, GALLUP POLITICS (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/156662/Congress-Approval-Ties-Time-Low.aspx. Although Congress’s
approval rating rebounded slightly in early 2013, it is still only at 15%. See Frank Newport, Congress Approval Holding Steady at 15%, GALLUP POLITICS (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160625/congress-approval-holding-steady.aspx.
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ards set by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.14
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that for the
purposes of free speech in the political arena, money and actual speech
are functionally identical,15 and as such, spending money on political
campaigns is protected under the First Amendment.
A. An Overview of Federal Campaign Finance Law
A brief glimpse of the development of modern campaign law is
necessary to understand why Citizens United represents such a departure
from past campaign finance jurisprudence. In 1971, Congress enacted the
Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).16 Following reports of
serious financial abuses in the 1972 Presidential election,17 Congress
made substantial amendments to FECA in 1974, including limiting campaign contributions for federal office,18 limiting expenditures by candidates and their committees,19 limiting independent expenditures,20 requiring disclosure of political contributions,21 and providing for the public
financing of presidential campaigns.22 A lawsuit was filed challenging
these amendments, and the Supreme Court decided the landmark campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.23 The Court in Buckley
made a number of groundbreaking decisions. First, it upheld public financing for presidential campaigns.24 Second, the decision held that both
campaign contributions and expenditures are protected under the First
Amendment.25 Finally, it created different levels of scrutiny for contribution limitations and expenditure limitations on the grounds that restrictions on expenditures “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression”26 while contribution limits entail “only a marginal restriction”27 on
14. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . ” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
15. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1(1976).
16. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1974).
17. The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMMITTEE,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated Jan. 2013).
18. 2 U.S.C § 441a (2002).
19. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1974).
20. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1974).
21. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2007).
22. 26 U.S.C. Subt. H (2013).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Although campaign finance law has undergone many
changes since Buckley, the case remains good law and is applied in virtually every campaign finance
case.
24. Id. at 85.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id. at 19.
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the contributor’s ability to speak. In other words, limitations on someone’s ability to spend money to share their opinions is too close to a limitation on an individual’s actual right to speak, while limitations on someone’s right to contribute money does not unduly restrict a person’s ability
to engage in the symbolic act of contributing to a campaign.28 Limitations on expenditures were subject to strict scrutiny, while limitations on
contributions were subjected to the lesser but still demanding “exacting
scrutiny” standard.29
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court has always
been as hostile to the regulation of campaign finance as it is today. The
Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on campaign spending in two key
cases in the last twenty years. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
was the first key case, decided in 1990.30 At issue in Austin was a Michigan law that banned the use of corporate treasury funds in independent
expenditures.31 The Court applied strict scrutiny and created a new compelling government interest in preventing the distorting effect of general
treasury dollars on political campaigns.32 The second case, McConnell v.
FEC,33 decided in 2003, upheld a federal law banning political parties
from soliciting or accepting34 so-called “soft money”—money donated to
political parties used to influence elections.35
However, this period of greater acceptance of regulation on campaign finance law was short-lived: both Austin and McConnell were expressly overruled in 2010 by Citizens United v. FEC.36 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court overturned a federal law barring the use of corpo-

27. Id. at 20.
28. A later United States Supreme Court case, Randall v. Sorrell, held that campaign contribution limits can be unconstitutional if they are so low that they serve to stifle speech. See Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261 (2006).
29. Although Buckley is credited with creating the “exacting scrutiny” standard of review, the
“exacting scrutiny” standard of review is better explained in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC: “Thus, under Buckley’s standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights, could survive if the Government demonstrated that contribution
regulation was ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’” 528 U.S. 377, 387–88
(2000).
30. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
31. Id. at 654.
32. Id. at 666.
33. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 108 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
34. The McConnell Court reviewed the law under exacting scrutiny, noting that the law in
question is a contribution limitation. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 108.
35. Id. at 95.
36. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
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rate treasury money for political campaigns.37 Citizens United further
held that the only sufficient government interest in regulating contributions or expenditures was to combat quid pro quo corruption,38 or the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption.39 Moreover, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down all contribution limitations on independent expenditures and independent expenditure committees in the case Speechnow.org v. FEC.40 The decision—premised on
Citizens United— held that any contribution limitations on independent
expenditure committees is unconstitutional because there is no risk of
quid pro quo corruption in these situations since independent expenditure
committees cannot donate directly to candidates.41 Prior to Speechnow.org, independent expenditure committees had strict limitations on
the amount of money they could accept from a single donor.42 The decision in Speechnow.org gave rise to what are now known as Super
PACs,43 which can raise and spend unlimited amounts of money provided that they do not donate or directly coordinate with candidate committees.44 These recent decisions by the Supreme Court have led some legal
commentators to conclude that disclosure may be the only restriction
favored by the current Supreme Court.45
Thus, current case law holds that any restrictions on expenditures
are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling purpose of removing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance

37. Id. at 365.
38. “Quid-pro-quo corruption” occurs when a politician accepts a contribution from a donor for
the express purpose of changing his position on an issue. This is a much narrower construction of
corruption previously accepted by the Court in McConnell, which held that corruption could include
the use of money to buy access to elected officials. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 96.
39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. For a more in-depth look at the holding and possible effects
of Citizens United see Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010). Additionally, “leveling the playing field” has been rejected as a legitimate government interest since the
Court’s decision in Buckley. This was reaffirmed in 2008 in Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554
U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008).
40. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (U.S. 2010).
41. Id. at 695.
42. Id.
43. For a more in-depth discussion of Super PACs, see Richard Briffault, Super Pacs, 96
MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012).
44. Super PACs spent over $609 million in the 2012 election cycle. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last updated June
12, 2013).
45. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money
in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011).
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of quid pro quo corruption.46 Furthermore, restrictions on contributions
are upheld only when they serve a sufficiently important government
interest and are closely drawn to serve that interest.47 Although campaign
finance disclosure also must meet the exacting scrutiny standard, most
disclosure laws have met this bar when challenged.48 The current state of
the law raises the question: What options are left to those who wish for
greater regulation of campaign finance?
B. Structure of State Session Freeze Statutes
A total of twenty-five states have some sort of ban on contributions
to elected officials while the state legislatures are in session.49 Twelve
different session freeze statutes have been challenged in various courts,
with mixed results. Session freeze statutes have been upheld in four cases,50 and overturned in eight.51 Additionally, session freeze statutes appear to be popular given that in all but one of the states where the law
was struck down the legislature later enacted an additional statute or regulation to restrict contributions during the legislative session.52 Although
courts have agreed—in all cases considering session freeze laws—that
the purpose of these statutes is to fight corruption or the appearance of
corruption, the holdings in these cases diverge drastically on whether the

46. Thus far, the Supreme Court has struck down almost all expenditure limits. For candidates,
see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976); for campaigns, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51; and for
corporations, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
48. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 45.
49. Fifteen states (Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada,
New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) have total bans on
contributions to sitting elected officials during the legislative session. Ten states (Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Vermont) have partial bans that are limited to lobbyists and/or PACs. Limits on Campaign Contributions During the
Legislative Session, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatureselections/elections/limits-on-contributions-during-session.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2013)..
50. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Yamada v.
Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012); Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political
Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44,
45 (Vt. 1995).
51. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2010); Ark. Right to Life
State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 716 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp.
1413, 1414 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 615 (Colo. 2010); Casino Ass’n of
La. v. State 820 So. 2d 494, 495 (La. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003); State v. Alaska
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 600 (Alaska 1999); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990).
52. For example, Missouri enacted another session freeze statute that was subsequently struck
down. See Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140, 148 (Mo. 2007).
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statutes are properly constructed to achieve this aim.53 Furthermore, although more of these statutes have been struck down than upheld,54 a
close examination of the cases demonstrates that there is a constitutional
way to construct a session freeze statute. Of the twenty-five states with
session freeze statutes, fifteen have a total ban on the acceptance of contributions during the legislative session.55 The remaining ten states have
slightly different regulations that only ban contributions given by certain
individuals, like lobbyists.56
Session freeze statutes are comprised of four basic components and
can generally be separated into two broad categories. These statutes are
comprised of four basic components: first, a delineation of what offices
are affected by the freeze; second, whether the law applies to incumbents
alone or includes challengers; third, an express timeframe for the restriction; and finally, whether any contributions are permissible or if all
are banned. In addition, session freeze laws can be separated into two
broad categories: those laws that restrict all contributions during the legislative session and those that only restrict contributions by certain individuals. The next two sections of this Comment will examine each of
these categories, starting with states that have a blanket ban on contributions to legislators during the legislative session.
1. Blanket Restrictions on Contributions During Session.
Fifteen states restrict all contributions during the legislative session,
regardless of the identity of the giver.57 However, these states are divided
on whom the session freeze affects. Six states have bans that affect all
state elected officials, including those whose duties are not predominantly legislative, for example, the comptroller and the attorney general.58
Nevada is alone in having its session freeze law apply to the legislature,
governor, and lieutenant governor,59 perhaps reflecting the role of the
53. See, e.g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 192; Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir.
1996); Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183; Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 716; Winborne v. Easley, 523 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 44.
54. A total of seven cases have directly challenged session freeze statutes. Of those seven, the
statutes were upheld in two and overturned in five. For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see
infra Part II.
55. See the fifteen state list, supra note 49.
56. See the fifteen state list, supra note 49.
57. See supra note 49.
58. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2013); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13235 (West 2013); Texas, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (West 2013); Texas Ethics Commission
Rule § 22.11; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.17A.560 (2013); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013).
59. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011).
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lieutenant governor as the president of the senate.60 Three states apply
their session freeze laws to only the legislature and the governor,61 and
some of these statutes name a different freeze period for the governor,
which is directly linked to the veto period for bills.62 The session freeze
laws in the remaining five states only affect the legislature.63
However, there is less variation in whether the laws affect both incumbents and challengers. Only three of the fifteen states have laws that
affect challengers and incumbents equally.64 Of the remaining twelve
states, eleven restrict donations to incumbents,65 and one state—New
Mexico—restricts contributions to both challenger and incumbent candidates for state legislature, but only the incumbent in the race for governor.66
In general, most session freeze laws only apply during the legislative session.67 Three states have bans that begin before the legislative
session starts and end after the legislative session ends.68 Two states have
bans that begin before the session starts, but end as soon as session closes.69 Finally, Wisconsin is an outlier in that it does not just ban contributions during the legislative session, but it bans all contributions at all
times except for the period between June 1st to election day during election years.70

60. NEV. CONST. ART. V, § 17.
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-310 (2013); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013); UTAH CODE § 36-11-305 (2012).
63. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule 15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361;
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-35 (2013); IND. CODE § 3-9-2-12 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:1505.2(Q) (2012).
64. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2013); IND. CODE § 3-9-2-12 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 13.625
(2013).
65. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule 15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361;
GA. CODE ANN § 21-5-35 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(Q) (2012); MD. CODE ANN.
ELEC. LAW § 13-235 (WEST 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10310 (2013); TEXAS ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (2013); Texas Ethics Commission Rule § 22.11;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.17A.560 (2013).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013).
67. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2)(2013); ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule
15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361; GA. CODE ANN § 21-5-35 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:1505.2(Q) (2012); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-235 (WEST 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2954 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012).
68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (West 2013);
Texas Ethics Commission Rule § 22.11; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.560 (2013).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-310 (2013).
70. WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013).
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Thus, the most blanket restriction session freeze laws affect both
the legislature and the governor, affect only currently sitting elected officials, and apply only during the duration of the legislative session.
2. Identity-Based Restrictions on Contributions During Session
Identity-based71 session freeze laws share a great deal in common
with total contribution bans.72 Like the session freeze laws discussed
above, identity-based bans vary depending on which elected officials are
affected, whether the law affects only incumbents or includes challengers, and the duration that the bans are in effect. The only major difference is that identity-based bans only bar certain individuals from donating during the prohibited time period.
States are split as to which elected officials are affected by identitybased session freeze laws. Four states have their session freeze affect all
elected state officials.73 Two states restrict contributions to the governor
and the legislature,74 and the remaining four states only restrict contributions to the legislature.75 The majority of identity-based restrictions apply
to both incumbents and challengers,76 with just three states restricting
their session freeze to incumbent officials.77 Additionally, most identitybased session freeze laws apply during the legislative session, with an
extended application for the governor during the veto period after the
legislative session ends.78 Only Kansas has a blackout period that starts
before the legislative session begins.79

71. It is worth noting here that a number of states and the federal government have identitybased blanket bans on contributions for some groups, most commonly lobbyists or government
contractors. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1)-(2) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 217-80 (2012).
72. See supra note 49.
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE
§ 68A.504 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012).
74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013).
75. MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Commission Rules § 257:10-1-6; VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013).
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE
§ 68A.504 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012); MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); OKLA.
STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Commission Rules § 257:10-1-6.
77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013); VT.
STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13b (WEST 2013).
78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610 (2013); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); IOWA CODE § 68A.504 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013);
MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013);
Oklahoma Ethics Commission Rules § 257:10-1-6.
79. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012).
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The hallmark of an identity-based ban is when specific individuals
are prohibited from donating during session. The identities of those prohibited from contributing to campaigns during session range from the
most prohibitive, which bar any non-individual person from contributing
during the freeze,80 to less expansive bans, such as bans on lobbyists and
Political Action Committees (PACs),81 and bans on lobbyists and their
employers.82 Additionally, Wisconsin, which has a total ban during the
legislative session on all contributions, also bars contributions from registered lobbyists at any time.83
Indeed, based on the aggregate of all these states’ statutes, the
standard identity-based session freeze law would affect all state elected
officials, apply to both incumbents and challengers, only apply during
the exact duration of the legislative session, and only apply to registered
lobbyists and those who employ them.
C. Challenges to State Session Freeze Laws
While a total of twenty-four84 states have some form of a session
freeze law currently on the books, these laws have been challenged a
whopping total of seven times. Furthermore, although these challenges
have been generally successful, a close reading of the cases demonstrates
that there are certain characteristics that courts find problematic, particularly how tailored the law is to the accepted government interest of
fighting corruption.
First, it is important to note that every case that has interpreted a
session freeze statute has reiterated the long-held concept that combating
corruption or the appearance of corruption is a compelling state interest.85 The strength of this government interest has been long recognized86
80. Id. Kansas also has an express ban on lobbyists and Political Action Committees from
contributing at any time, not just during the legislative session. Id.
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE § 68A.504 (2013); MINN. STAT.
§ 10A.273 (2013).
82. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); ME.
REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Commission
Rules § 257:10-1-6; VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013).
83. WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013).
84. Four other states, California, Illinois, Kentucky, and South Carolina, have total bans on
lobbyist contributions, regardless of time of year. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 430 / 5-40 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-17-80 (2012).
85. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1999); Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp.
1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630 (Alaska
1999); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla.
1990).
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and was affirmed in Citizens United.87 Second, it is also important to
note the courts’ divergence on which standard of review should be applied to session freeze statutes. Although Buckley established that contribution limits are to be governed by the slightly less-deferential exacting
scrutiny standard,88 most courts have actually chosen to apply strict scrutiny.89 These courts appear to be applying strict scrutiny because they
believe that the kind of restriction on associational or speech freedoms
represented by a ban on contributions, even one that is temporary in nature, must meet that higher bar.90 To date, six of the seven courts to examine session freeze laws have applied strict scrutiny.91 The remaining
court appropriately applied exacting scrutiny, noting that Buckley expressly held that contribution limits are a lesser restriction on speech and
associational freedoms than expenditure limits.92
The standard of review question is critical in campaign finance cases, as it is in most cases that analyze constitutional rights. Of the six cases that have examined session freeze laws under strict scrutiny, only
one93 has upheld the statute at issue. Conversely, the only court to apply
the exacting scrutiny analysis upheld the session freeze law.94 That being
said, the court’s choice of a standard of review cannot be regarded as
wholly dispositive of the outcome in these cases; other factors, such as
whether the laws affected both challengers and incumbents, must also be
considered. The following subsections of this Comment will focus on the
aforementioned seven cases, their outcomes, and which factors appear to
have controlled the courts’ analysis.

86. This interest was cited with strong approval in Buckley. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26
(1976).
87. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
88. See supra note 29.
89. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715; Ark. Right to Life State Political Action
Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Dodd,
561 So. 2d 263.
90. See, e.g., Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264 (“As a result, we believe the present case involves
weighty free speech and associational rights protected both by federal and Florida constitutional law.
Any restrictions the state imposes on the conduct in question must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.”) (internal citations omitted).
91. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715; Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v.
Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d
597, 630 (Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
92. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
93. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 717.
94. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51.
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1. Overturned Session Freeze Laws
All six of the session freeze laws that were overturned were deemed
unconstitutional because they were overinclusive, underinclusive, or
both.95 Additionally, these cases shared two other key similarities: first,
the courts applied strict scrutiny,96 and second, each court agreed that the
government had a legitimate state interest in the prevention of corruption
or the appearance of corruption with a session freeze statute.97 The
courts’ approval of the use of session freeze laws to combat corruption
and the appearance of corruption is critical because this is the only legitimate government interest sanctioned by Citizens United.98
It is necessary to look at the construction of the specific session
freeze statutes in order to understand what distinguishes those that were
upheld from those that were overturned. Four of the five challenged statutes encompassed both incumbents and challengers seeking office.99 Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Committee v. Butler (ARTL),
the only case that struck down a statute that applied to only incumbents,
relied heavily on one of the cases that struck down a law that applied to
both challengers and incumbents.100 This distinction is critical because
each of the courts focused on the overbroad nature of the statute when
discussing why the statute was unconstitutional.101
For example, in Emison v. Catalano, the Tennessee Supreme Court
focused heavily on the argument that the inclusion of non-incumbents
drastically reduced the government’s anti-corruption interest.102 The
court held that the session freeze law, “although inspired by the commendable impulse to eliminate corruption and the appearance of corruption in political life, cannot constitutionally be applied to contributions to
non-incumbent candidates for seats in the legislature.”103 Furthermore,
when discussing whether the law was narrowly tailored, the court held
that black-out provisions, like the one challenged, did not provide the
95. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D.
Ark. 1998); Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421–22; Alaska
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66.
96. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 551; Emison, 951 F.
Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1420; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d
at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
97. See cases cited supra note 85.
98. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
99. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 716–17; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1414; Alaska Civil
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 630; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 263–64.
100. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 550–52.
101. See cases cited supra note 95.
102. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723.
103. Id.
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least intrusive means of achieving the elimination of political corruption.
The court held that this method deprived non-incumbents, who are not
subject to corrupting quid pro quo arrangements in the same way as are
sitting legislators, of any means to counterbalance incumbents’ advantage of “virtually unlimited access to the press and free publicity
merely by virtue of the public forum they are privileged to occupy.”104
The Alaska Supreme Court overturned its state’s session freeze law for
similar reasons.105
Other courts emphasized the underinclusive nature of the session
freeze laws in their decisions to overturn the statutes while still agreeing
that the inclusion of challengers was a serious problem. For example, the
court in State v. Dodd was concerned with other factors it felt rendered
the law as both over and underinclusive.106 Like the courts in Tennessee
and Alaska, the Dodd court agreed that the inclusion of non-incumbent
challengers weakened the state’s anti-corruption interest.107 The court
further held that the statute’s inclusion of special sessions of the legislature in the ban, which could occur at any time and last an unknown duration, represented a serious constraint on fundraising.108 Moreover, the
court felt that the name recognition and contacts within the community
enjoyed by incumbents rendered them able to handle a session freeze
better than challengers, placing challengers at a serious disadvantage.109
Finally, the Dodd court found the statute to be underinclusive because
the statute ignored the fact that potentially corrupting contributions could
be made when the legislature was not in session.110
Similarly, the courts in ARTL and Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v.
Maupin (Shrink Mo.) were also concerned about the underinclusive nature of the statutes because a corrupting contribution could happen at any
time.111 The ARTL and Shrink Mo. courts differ from the courts in Dodd,
Alaska Civil Liberties Union, and Emison, however, because they expressly found their respective session freeze laws overbroad on the
grounds that small contributions have no corrupting effect.112 The court
in Shrink Mo. further determined that while combating corruption and
104. Id.
105. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 631 (Alaska 1999).
106. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990).
107. Id. at 265.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 265–66.
111. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D.
Ark. 1998); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
112. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421.
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the appearance of corruption is a compelling government interest, the
state had not demonstrated enough concrete proof that any corruption or
appearance of corruption had occurred.113
Although an important decision, ARTL is an outlier because the
statute in this case only applied to incumbents.114 Although the court in
ARTL relied on many of the same arguments advanced in Shrink Mo.,115
the court failed to distinguish the key characteristic that the law only applied to incumbents. Furthermore, the court in ARTL also relied heavily
on the district court’s opinion in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v.
Bartlett, which was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit.116 Accordingly,
the outcome in ARTL is questionable.
Consequently, courts tend to overturn session freeze statutes when
the laws are insufficiently tailored to meet the compelling government
interest of combating corruption. Statutes are overinclusive when they
include challengers who have no ability to directly affect legislation
while they are campaigning.117 Additionally, a few courts found that
these statutes were underinclusive because a corrupting contribution
could occur at any time, not just during the legislative session.118 Finally,
the fact that each of these courts utilized strict scrutiny review119 must be
considered in the overall analysis.120
2. Upheld Session Freeze Laws
Because only two courts have found session freeze laws to be constitutional, it is harder to draw any broad-based conclusions. However,
these two cases do share a few key characteristics. First, like the cases in
Part II.C.1,121 both courts agreed that the state had a compelling interest
in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption.122 Second,

113. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421.
114. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
115. In fact, large portions of the case are direct quotes to Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC.
116. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1999).
117. See cases cited supra note 95.
118. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990).
119. See cases cited supra note 96.
120. The problems with applying strict scrutiny review to session freeze laws will be discussed
in more detail infra Part IV.A.
121. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D.
Ark. 1998); Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC
v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1421–22 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978
P.2d 597, 631 (Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66.
122. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1999); Kimbell v.
Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
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unlike the cases in Part II.C.1,123 both courts found the session freeze
laws in question to be suitably tailored to achieve this compelling interest.124 However, unlike session freeze laws that have been overturned,
there is a split on which standard of review is used by the courts. One of
the two cases applied strict scrutiny125 while the other applied exacting
scrutiny.126
The first case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett
(NCRTL),127 is the only case to apply strict scrutiny to a session freeze
law and find the statute constitutional.128 This in and of itself is not remarkable because the statute has a key attribute that renders it far more
narrowly tailored than the statutes discussed above. The statute at issue
in NCRTL was an identity-based ban,129 unlike the total bans discussed
above. North Carolina’s statute established an absolute ban during session on the acceptance and solicitation of contributions to both incumbents and challengers for legislative office by lobbyists and any PAC that
employs a lobbyist.130
North Carolina’s statute has a number of factors that render the law
narrower than the total bans discussed above. It applies only to members
of the legislature and the lobbyists who have day-to-day interactions with
them during the legislative session.131 The court in NCRTL held that this
factor demonstrated the compelling nature of the government’s anticorruption interest.132 Furthermore, the court stated that “[i]f lobbyists
are free to contribute to legislators while pet projects sit before them, the
temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political favors’ can be powerful.”133
Additionally, the court cited evidence of actual corruption through pay-

123. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Emison, 951 F.
Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421–22; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978
P.2d at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66.
124. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 716; Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51.
125. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715.
126. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 50.
127. The case cited here is the Fourth Circuit opinion that found the statute to be constitutional,
reversing the district court opinion mentioned above.
128. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13B(c) (West 2013).
130. Id.; N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 714.
131. “While the General Assembly is in regular session, no limited contributee or the real or
purported agent of a limited contributee shall: (1) Solicit a contribution from a limited contributor to
be made to that limited contributee or to be made to any other candidate, officeholder, or political
committee; or (2) Solicit a third party, requesting or directing that the third party directly or indirectly solicit a contribution from a limited contributor or relay to the limited contributor the limited
contributee’s solicitation of a contribution.” N.C. GEN.STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13B(c) (West 2013).
132. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715–16.
133. Id.
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to-play scandals in other states134 and noted that there did not need to be
any proof of actual corruption in North Carolina because “[t]he First
Amendment does not prevent states . . . from recognizing these dangers
and taking reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption
does not undermine public confidence in the integrity of representative
democracy.”135
The court in NCRTL found the statute to be narrowly tailored because the statute only restricted contributions by lobbyists and PACs and
the law was limited to the time when corruption issues were most likely
to occur.136 First, the court found a direct link with the anti-corruption
interest because the restrictions were focused on only lobbyists and the
political committees that employed them, noting that these were the “two
most ubiquitous and powerful players in the political arena.”137 Second,
the court found that the statute was narrowly tailored to combating corruption because the limitations did not prohibit all contributions and focused only on the “period during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo
or the appearance of one runs highest.”138 The court also rejected arguments by the plaintiffs that the statute was overbroad due to its inclusion
of challengers because challengers cannot vote for legislation and therefore could not be corrupted by a donation. However, the court noted that
a contribution to a challenger could serve as a “powerful [] incentive” to
an incumbent politician to vote against those who donated to their opponents, and thus could still lead to corruption.139
Although the NCRTL court employed a similar rationale as did the
court in Kimbell v. Hooper,140 the second case in which a session freeze
law was upheld, the two statutes involved had important differences. The
courts also used different standards of review. In Kimbell, the Vermont
Supreme Court examined a similar statute and reached many of the same
conclusions as the NCRTL court. The statute in question was even narrower than the North Carolina statue in NCRTL. Like the North Carolina
statute, the statute in Vermont was an identity-based restriction that
banned lobbyists and employers of lobbyists from making contributions
during session.141 However, the Vermont statute only affected incumbent
legislators, allowing contributions to challengers to continue during the
134. Id. at 716.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 715–16.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
141. VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013).
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legislative session.142 Another key difference was that the court in Kimbell properly applied exacting scrutiny, noting that Buckley expressly
created this standard of review for contribution limitations.143 The court
in Kimbell further held that because the limitations were only temporary
in nature, the temporal restrictions in the statute were a lesser constraint
than the dollar values limited in Buckley.144
Beyond the narrower construction of the statute and the different
standard of review, the court in Kimbell did much of the same analysis
and reached a similar conclusion as the court in NCRTL. First, the court
found that the state had a sufficiently important interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption.145 Second, the court found the
statute to be closely drawn because “the limited prohibition focuses on a
narrow period during which legislators could be, or could appear to be,
pressured, coerced, or tempted into voting on the basis of cash contributions rather than on consideration of the public weal.”146
Although only two courts have considered this issue, both courts
upheld their state’s session freeze statute for similar reasons. Therefore,
it appears that courts will uphold session freeze statutes when they are
based on both the identity of the contributor and restricted to only members of the legislature because these limitations render the statutes
properly tailored to the government interest of preventing corruption.147
While there is a split as to the applicable standard of review, it is clear
that session freeze laws can meet both the lower exacting scrutiny as well
as the higher strict scrutiny.
III. A FEDERAL SESSION FREEZE PROPOSAL
Whether it is true that Citizens United made it impossible to reduce
the amount of money flowing into political campaigns, it is still critical
that the government take steps to reduce the appearance of corruption.
States enacted session freeze laws in part to help create a bright line between the two roles a politician must occupy: candidate and elected official. The need for some kind of line between campaigning and governing
is nothing new,148 and this Comment suggests that the introduction of a
142. Id.
143. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 50.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1999); Kimbell, 665
A.2d at 51.
148. See, e.g., BRENDAN DOHERTY, THE POLITICS OF THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN:
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL, FUNDRAISING, AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 1977–2004 (2007), availa-
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session freeze at the federal level would help restore citizens’ faith in
government and help ease the perception that an elected official’s vote is
for sale.
A. Congress Should Enact an Identity-Based Session Freeze During
Congress’s Official Session
Congress should enact a law to prohibit contributions by lobbyists
and the employers of lobbyists while Congress is in official session. This
proposal incorporates the factors cited with approval by state courts and
avoids the issues that resulted in other state statutes being overturned.
The proposal would only impact incumbent members of Congress. Additionally, the law would only regulate contributions by lobbyists and the
employers of lobbyists.149 Furthermore, the ban would take place only
while the chamber that the member belongs to is in session. This last element, however, is the most problematic as neither chamber of Congress
meets full-time when they are called into session by leadership.150 Conversely, most state legislatures—including all state legislatures with session freeze statutes—are part-time in nature and only meet full-time during certain parts of the year.151 For example, the Washington State Legislature meets ninety days in odd numbered years and sixty days in even
numbered years, with the first day of session beginning the second Monday in January.152
Although the lack of a statutorily defined session appears to be an
issue, the level of control the majority caucus leaders have renders this
issue moot. At first glance, the lack of a definitive calendar might make
it more difficult to easily pinpoint the times at which corruption, or the
appearance of corruption, are most likely to take place. With further consideration, however, it becomes clear that a session freeze law could still
ble at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p196697index.html (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association at the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago, Illinois).
149. It is important to note that there is already precedent for an identity-based restriction on
donations to federal elected officials. 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1)–(2) currently prohibits current or prospective government contractors from making any contributions to federal elected officials at any
time. An injunction against the enforcement of this ban was recently rejected by the U.S. District
Court in Washington, D.C. See Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 99 (D.D.C.
2012).
150. In fact, Congress must only meet once a year to satisfy the Constitution’s requirements.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 4, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2. The actual schedules of the House and
Senate are set by leadership, rather than statute. See Eric Cantor, House Calendar,
MAJORITYLEADER, http://majorityleader.gov/Calendar/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
151. See, e.g., Full and Part-time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx (last updated June 2009).
152. Wash. Const. art. II, § 12.
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follow the same template as a state session freeze law. A federal session
freeze law should begin on the first day of the regular session for both
chambers of Congress and last until the final day. Both chambers already
take recesses to allow for district visits and campaigning,153 and it would
be simple to turn those recesses into full adjournments and adjust the rest
of the congressional calendar accordingly.
While one can argue that elected officials might ignore the issue by
continuing to use recesses rather than adjournments to allowed continual
fundraising, this problem would be addressed at the ballot box. If members of Congress do not appear to be spending enough time legislating,
this problem can become a campaign issue that can, and likely will, be
taken back to the electorate. Even members of Congress admit that they
spend an inordinate amount of time fundraising.154 This issue is partially
caused by the lack of a fixed session; citizens simply do not know when
Congress is going about their work. This proposal would create an incentive for politicians to partition their time and make it easier for the electorate to see exactly how much time is spent legislating compared to
fundraising. If the citizens did not agree, they would then be armed with
sufficient information to take to the ballot box.
Structurally, the proposal is substantively identical to the Vermont
law upheld in Kimbell. The proposal would apply only to incumbent
members of the legislature, affect only contributions from lobbyists and
their employers, and last only while Congress is officially in session.155
Additionally, this formula could easily be enacted in each of the twentyfive states that do not currently have a session freeze law, which, as this
Comment argues, makes it an effective tool to limit corruption or the appearance of corruption in national politics.156

153. See Cantor, supra note 150.
154. See, e.g., Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 08, 2013, 7:30 AM),
http://www.huffington post.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html ;
Andy Kroll, Retiring Senator: Congress Doesn’t Work Because We Fundraise Way Too Much,
MOTHER JONES (Jan. 28, 2013, 7:48 AM), http://www.motherjones.com /mojo/2013/01/tom-harkinretire-senator-fundraise-money.
155. See VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013).
156. Although twenty-five states do not have session freeze laws, three states (California,
Kentucky, and South Carolina) have blanket identity-based bans against fundraising for lobbyists at
any time. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (West 2012);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-80 (2012). Illinois also has a blanket ban against fundraising in the county
that holds the capitol during session. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 430 / 5-40 (West 2009).
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IV. A FEDERAL SESSION FREEZE WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
Inevitably, any new federal campaign law will be challenged in
court, particularly in this climate of deregulating the campaign industry.157 The proposal in Part III is likely to survive such a challenge because it supports an accepted government interest—the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption—and is tailored in a way
that has survived similar constitutional challenges. From a policy perspective, this proposal balances the need to allow elected officials to
raise the funds necessary to compete in an election with the need to create a bright-line delineation between governing and campaigning. Furthermore, this proposal does not create an undue hardship—a potential
constitutional challenge—on incumbent elected officials because state
elected officials, while not elected at quite the staggering158 rate as federal elected officials, are still reelected over 80% of the time. 159 For example in Washington state, which has a blanket restriction on contributions
during session, only three incumbent elected officials out of one hundred
forty-seven lost in 2012.160 In twelve of the fourteen states with blanket
restrictions on contributions during session, only four incumbents on average lost their races per state.161 Furthermore, the creation of a bright
line between governing and campaigning will help reduce citizen frustrations about moneyed interests having too much influence. Although the
2012 election was the most expensive election in history,162 it appears
that money alone is not enough to buy an election.163 Accordingly, regulating the amount of money raised and spent in a campaign alone is not
enough to help restore citizens’ faith in government. While frustrations
about campaign spending and accountability do not comprise the total
157. In the last three years, a number of long-standing campaign finance restrictions have been
successfully overturned. For cases striking down corporate campaign contributions, independent
expenditure limits, and public financing see supra note 46.
158. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates Over the Years, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
159. Geoff Pallay, Ballotpedia Study: More Incumbent State Legislators Losing in Primaries
Than Prior Election Cycles, BALLOTPEDIA, http://107.6.13.241/wiki/index.php/Ballotpedia_study:
_More_incumbent_state_legislators_losing_in_primaries_than_prior_election_cycles.
160. Ballotopedia’s State Legislative Team, Incumbents Defeated in 2012’s State Legislative
Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Incumbents_defeated_in_2012%27s
_state_legislative_elections#tab=General_Election (last modified May 29, 2013, 3:31 PM).
161. Id.
162. Hudson, supra note 2.
163. Of the over $1 billion in independent expenditures made in the 2012 cycle, nearly $730
million was spent by conservative groups compared to $305 million by liberal groups. CTR. FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees,
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php?cycle=2012&view=Y&
chart=N (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
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reason why citizens do not trust their government, it is a component, and
one this proposal helps address.
The next two subsections will evaluate the proposal suggested in
Part III. As a threshold matter, subpart A will discuss the confusion
around the standard of review for session freeze laws and demonstrate
that exacting scrutiny is the proper standard of review. Subpart B will
apply both standards of review to the proposal and demonstrate why it
should be found constitutional if challenged.
A. Exacting Scrutiny Is the Proper Standard of Review
Because the proposal would likely be challenged, it is necessary to
elaborate on the proper standard of review for session freeze laws. The
proper standard of review for session freeze laws is exacting scrutiny.
Unfortunately, the standard of review question has been muddled because lower courts have mistakenly applied strict scrutiny over the last
thirty years. The decision some courts have made to apply strict scrutiny
to session freeze laws appears to be based on the erroneous conclusion
that a temporary ban on contributions is such a large constraint on speech
that it should be considered more akin to an expenditure limit than a contribution limit.164 However, this argument contradicts the plain language
of Buckley.165
Buckley clearly provided that contribution limitations required a
lesser standard of review than expenditure limitations because a limitation on the amount of money a person can give to a candidate or campaign organization “involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”166 Since Buckley, many cases
have cited this rule with approval and applied the lower exacting scrutiny
standard to contribution limitations.167 Conversely, the Supreme Court
has rarely applied strict scrutiny to contribution limitations.168 Many
lower courts thus appear to apply the more rigorous standard of review to

164. See, e.g., State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 1990).
165. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259–60
(1986); Cal. Medical Ass’n v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
plurality); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981).
168. See, e.g., Cal. Medical Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 201–02 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in
judgment); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun & O’Connor, JJ., concurring
in judgment).
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either ensure that they grant sufficient deference to the First Amendment
or out of fear of being reversed by a higher court.
The decision to apply strict scrutiny by the lower courts is often
backed by illogical arguments and mischaracterizations of the exacting
scrutiny standard. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Carver v. Nixon169
chose to apply strict scrutiny after noting that Buckley and the subsequent
United States Supreme Court cases chose to apply exacting scrutiny because “[t]he Court has not ruled that anything other than strict scrutiny
applies in cases involving contribution limits.”170 This conclusion comes
after a fairly exhaustive examination of opinions applying exacting scrutiny to contribution limits, which noted that exacting scrutiny is the
standard applied in most majority and plurality opinions.171 Furthermore,
the decisions by a few courts to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limitation cases are then compounded because other courts will use those
cases as a basis to apply strict scrutiny in their own decisions. For example, the decision of the Fourth Circuit to use strict scrutiny in NCRTL
was premised completely on the Eighth Circuit’s decision to do so in
Carver.172
Additionally, courts in Alaska,173 Missouri,174 and Tennessee175 either partially or wholly premised their decision to apply strict scrutiny on
the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Dodd. The Dodd court
dealt with the standard of review in a cursory manner, noting only that
“[a]ny restrictions the state imposes on the conduct [protected by the
First Amendment] must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”176 What is more, the Dodd court cites Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce for its authority of the use of the strict scrutiny
standard.177
Reliance on Austin for the standard of review for contribution limitation cases is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the Supreme
169. The law in question in Carver would have limited contributions by an individual to a
candidate to $100 per election cycle in low-population legislative districts, $200 per cycle in highpopulation legislative districts, and $300 per cycle for state-wide elected office. Carver v. Nixon, 72
F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1995).
170. Id. at 637.
171. Id.
172. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999).
173. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630 n.195 (Alaska 1999); Shrink
Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1421–22 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
174. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1420.
175. Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
176. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 1990).
177. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Court held in Austin that the law in question did not violate the First
Amendment, and it was utilizing strict scrutiny as part of an equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.178 Second, the law in
question in Austin prevented corporations from using general treasury
funds for independent expenditures, to which Buckley clearly stated the
proper standard of review was strict scrutiny.179 Finally, although this
critique does not apply to the Florida Supreme Court in 1995 when Dodd
was decided, it is important to note going forward that Austin is no longer good law because Citizens United overruled the case in 2010.180
Similarly, the court in ARTL erroneously based its decision to apply
strict scrutiny on a misstatement in McIntyre v. Ohio.181 In McIntyre, the
Supreme Court claimed to subject the statute to exacting scrutiny review;
however, the standard the Court articulated was actually strict scrutiny.182
The court in ARTL took this to mean that strict scrutiny was the proper
standard because the actual standard articulated by Supreme Court was
closer to strict scrutiny.183 In contrast, the Vermont Supreme Court
properly applied the exacting scrutiny standard in Kimbell, noting that
the Buckley court expressly held that contribution limitations are held to
a lower standard than expenditure limits.184
Exacting scrutiny is the proper standard of review in session freeze
cases because it is a bright-line rule that was expressly laid down by the
Supreme Court in Buckley.185 Furthermore, as noted in Kimbell, exacting
scrutiny is “less burdensome than the dollar limits upheld in Buckley”186
because it sets “no overall limits” on contributions and functions “solely
as a timing measure, banning contributions to individual members only
while the General Assembly is in session.”187 Furthermore, session freeze
laws do not prohibit contributions to political parties, PACs, or any other
political entity during session—only those made to individual legislators.
This allows other outlets for individuals who wish to make political contributions during session and do not want to wait until after the session
freeze has ended. The ability to donate to other political causes, like po178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.
181. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
182. In McIntyre, the Court said it would uphold the statute “only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve an overriding state interest.” Id. This is clearly strict scrutiny.
183. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 547 (W.D.
Ark. 1998).
184. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995).
185. See supra note 29.
186. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51.
187. Id.

2013]

State Session Freeze Laws

279

litical parties and PACs, lessens the overall restriction a session freeze
law places on freedom of speech.
B. Proposal Meets Both Strict and Exacting Scrutiny
Although exacting scrutiny188 is the proper standard of review—as
noted above—the proposal will also likely meet strict scrutiny review.
There is little doubt that combating corruption or the appearance of corruption is a compelling government interest.189 The weakest part of the
analysis for strict scrutiny is the narrowly tailored element, as strict scrutiny requires there to be no less-restrictive alternatives. Although a difficult standard to meet, this proposal is narrowly crafted and would most
likely survive both closely drawn and narrowly tailored review.
1. Preventing Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption Are Compelling and Sufficiently Important Government Interests
There is little doubt that combating corruption and the appearance
of corruption are sufficient government interests to survive both strict
and exacting scrutiny. First, every court that has considered a session
freeze statute has agreed that the anti-corruption interest is compelling.190
The universal acceptance of the prevention of corruption as a government interest in campaign finance demonstrates that this interest is sufficient to meet the first prong of either exacting or strict scrutiny review.
Preventing corruption by barring lobbyists from directly donating to legislators while their projects are being considered will help ensure that the
public’s trust in the political process is not further harmed. Additionally,
as noted in NCRTL, “[l]egislative action which is procured directly
through gifts, or even campaign contributions, too often fails to reflect
what is in the public interest, what enjoys public support, or what represents a legislator’s own conscientious assessment of the merits of a proposal.”191
Second, the anti-corruption interest demonstrated by preventing
contributions from lobbyists while legislators are voting satisfies even
the narrowest reading of Citizens United. The Citizens United Court
adopted a very narrow construction of what constitutes corruption or the
appearance of corruption. In the minds of the majority in Citizens United,
only the danger of quid pro quo corruption is enough to constitute a
188. Law must be “closely drawn” to satisfy a “sufficiently important” government interest.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
189. See supra note 86.
190. Id.
191. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999).
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compelling government interest.192 This proposal directly aligns with this
interest by only barring contributions to currently sitting members of
Congress who are presently considering legislation and, furthermore,
only limits contributions by lobbyists and their employers who necessarily have a direct stake in that legislation. Although the court in ARTL
claimed that only large contributions represented a danger of corruption,193 this sentiment was rejected by Buckley.
The Court in Buckley squarely disavowed the idea that a court
should supplant the decision of the legislature about what level of contribution limits were acceptable.194 Furthermore, the Court further clarified
this conclusion when it held that only contribution limits that prevent a
candidate from amassing enough funds to compete violated the First
Amendment.195 This proposal does not institute any limitation on the
amount or method by which a candidate can raise funds or a donor can
contribute them. Rather, as noted in NCRTL, session freeze laws only
create a temporary bar on when these funds may be raised.196 Moreover,
the court in NCRTL dealt with the argument that only large contributions
corrupt directly, noting that “[c]orruption, either petty or massive, is a
compelling state interest because it distorts both the concept of popular
sovereignty and the theory of representative government.”197
Finally, virtually every case that has interpreted any kind of campaign finance regulation—be it a contribution limit, expenditure limit,
disclosure, or public financing—has noted that the anti-corruption interest is compelling.198 In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that limitations
on contributions are the “primary means” by which the Court has allowed the government to limit corruption.199
Therefore, the proposal would be found to meet exacting scrutiny
because it serves the compelling interest of preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption, which has been recognized as the only “inter-

192. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
193. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D.
Ark. 1998).
194. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)
195. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000).
196. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 716.
197. Id. at 715.
198. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825
(2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395;
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 726 (2008); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; SpeechNow.org
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (U.S.
2010).
199. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
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est sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests implicated by contributions for political speech.”200
2. The Proposal Is Both Narrowly Tailored and Closely Drawn
It is less certain if the proposal is sufficiently tailored to meet the
anti-corruption interest required by strict scrutiny. Each of the state session freeze statutes that have been found unconstitutional was struck
down because it failed the tailoring prong of the analysis.201 That being
said, this proposal is constructed in such a way to avoid the pitfalls that
caused most other session freeze laws to be struck down.
First, the proposal only applies to incumbents, who are sitting
members of Congress. This construction avoids the over and underinclusive tailoring issues caused by including non-sitting candidates. The anticorruption interest is strongest when it is most closely linked to those
who are most likely to be corrupted. Because challengers themselves
cannot directly vote for or against legislative proposals, several courts
found laws that included them to be overbroad.202 Furthermore, by excluding challengers, this proposal avoids being an incumbency protection
measure because it burdens sitting members only and does not place any
restriction on challengers. By only affecting incumbents, this proposal
answers one of the major concerns of the Dodd court 203 as well as a frequent critique of other campaign finance reform efforts.204
Second, the proposal only affects lobbyists and those that employ
them. Lobbyists are an everyday part of life in Washington, D.C., just as
they are in state legislatures. Lobbyists meet with members day in and
day out to attempt to persuade them to support or oppose certain projects.
Because of this close working relationship, lobbyists have increased access to legislators, and thus an increased ability to influence their actions.205 Furthermore, the same lobbyists who work with legislators to
craft and pass proposals are typically the same individuals who hand out

200. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 692.
201. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D.
Ark. 1998); Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC
v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978
P.2d 597, 631(Alaska 1999); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990).
202. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1422; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at
631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266.
203. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 266.
204. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 255 (2006); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000).
205. For a more in-depth look at how lobbying works in state capitols, see Trevor D. Dryer,
Gaining Access: A State Lobbying Case Study, 23 J.L. & POL. 283 (2007).
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contribution checks during campaign season.206 The fact that lobbyists
exist in these dual roles creates a problematic issue for campaign finance
regulation. Even if lobbyists are not intending to, or actually engaging in,
pay-to-play politics with elected officials, there will always be the appearance that this is occurring. This is why the anti-corruption interest
allows for the appearance of corruption to be a compelling interest. As
noted in NCRTL, “[e]ven if lobbyists have no intention of directly ‘purchasing’ favorable treatment, appearances may be otherwise.”207 Thus,
by restricting the timing of contributions by those who have the highest
incentive to engage in quid pro quo corruption, the proposal is closely
drawn to only capture the most troublesome contacts. Moreover, this limitation addresses the very real appearance of corruption that worries
many citizens.
Finally, the proposal is only in effect during regular sessions of
Congress, which is the time during which quid pro quo corruption is
most likely to take place. By focusing only on the time when actual votes
on laws are taking place, the proposal focuses on the time at which the
most pressure could be brought to bear on elected officials. As noted by
the Kimbell court, a limited prohibition that focuses on the “narrow period during which legislators could be, or could appear to be, pressured,
coerced, or tempted into voting on the basis of cash contributions rather
than on consideration of the public weal”208 is closely drawn to address
that specific concern. Although some courts were concerned that the exclusion of contributions at other points in the year are underinclusive because those contributions could corrupt,209 this argument ignores the
basic workings of a legislature. It is common for bills to be amended as
part of the legislative process and for amendments to cause a legislator
who once authored a bill to oppose it.210 Claiming that an elected official
could be corrupted by a contribution made when a bill is in its infancy
ignores this basic reality. Additionally, limiting the law to only regular
sessions removes the concern that fundraising would become impossible

206. For an in-depth look at the interaction between regulation of lobbyists in their roles as
lobbyists and campaign contributors, see Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2008).
207. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999).
208. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
209. See, e.g., Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540,
553 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
210. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Rubio Currently Opposes Own Immigration Bill, WASH. POST
(June 5, 2013, 8:39 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/ 2013/06/05/rubiocurrently-opposes-own-immigration-bill/.
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due to infinite special sessions.211 Furthermore, because the U.S. House
and Senate create their own schedules,212 they are not vulnerable to a
special session called by a governor, as are state legislatures. Moreover,
this fact means the leadership in Congress can evaluate—with input from
their members—how much time is needed to campaign versus legislate
and ensure that Congress is not in session when members would need
time to fundraise. Finally, this flexibility has a backstop in the political
process; if the voters feel that Congress is spending too much time fundraising and not enough campaigning, they can choose to elect a challenger. Thus, the proposal clearly meets the closely drawn requirement of the
strict scrutiny standard because it only affects the parties most likely to
be corrupted during the most likely time for corruption to occur.
However, it is much less certain that the proposal can meet the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny. Although it can be argued that this
proposal does not meet the narrowly tailored standard because there are
less restrictive alternatives, this argument is not compelling. Federal
criminal laws that bar legislators from taking money for votes do nothing
to address the fact that this requires actual corruption to have already
occurred. As noted in NCRTL, the First Amendment does not prevent
governments from recognizing the potential for corruption and “taking
reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption does not undermine public confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.”213 The appearance of corruption is no less compelling than actual
corruption,214 and criminal laws do nothing to prevent the appearance of
undue influence that exist in the interwoven nature of lobbying and campaigning.
V. CONCLUSION
Post-Citizens United, many professionals are concerned about the
appearance of our campaigns, and the potential influence of unlimited
money on candidates.215 That being said, the current Supreme Court appears to strongly favor deregulation and a policy of non-legislative inter-

211. See State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1990) (holding a session freeze law overbroad because it included special sessions that could be called at any time and last any duration).
212. See supra text accompanying note 150.
213. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976)).
214. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
215. See, e.g., Senator Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
235 (2010).
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ference into the political speech arena.216 To deal with these two contradictory realities, it is important for reformers to think outside of the box
and have a clear idea of the outcome they are trying to produce.
In the current climate of the Supreme Court, it is probably impossible to take any real steps to remove or reduce the role of money in politics. The inertia on the Court is simply too strong against regulating
money as speech. Even should some of the more conservative members
retire in the next few years, the Court would still have to grapple with
stare decisis and overruling one of its biggest recent decisions. Perhaps
rather than trying to reduce the amount of money in politics, the real focus should be on trying to figure out why citizens do not feel well represented in their government or trust the campaign process. It is with this
concept in mind that this Comment suggests a proposal that creates a
more bright-line difference between the time elected officials spend
campaigning and the time they spend governing.
Although it can be argued that the proposal does not make any major changes in how campaign contributions are gathered, perhaps that is
why it is likely to succeed. Because it is not taking any major steps to
undermine the precedent the Court has already articulated, it has a
chance to be one part of combating the distrust by which regular citizens
view the political system. If we refuse to take small steps for fear that
they are akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, we are missing the point of our legislative process and missing a chance to take a
chance to improve citizens’ relationship with their government.

216. Carson Griffis, Comment, Ending A Peculiar Evil: The Constitution, Campaign Finance
Reform, and the Need for A Change in Focus After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
773 (2011).

